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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
       yberspace has long been characterized as anarchic, a domain devoid of 
normative constraint. Indeed, in remarks to the U.N. General Assembly on 
his priorities for 2020, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres urged the 
international community to “usher in order to the Wild West of cyber-
space,”1 an echo of President Barack Obama’s 2015 remark at Stanford Uni-
versity that “[t]he cyber world is sort of the Wild West.”2 Obviously, neither 
leader meant that international law did not reach cyber activities, but they 
were signaling the uncertainly pervading the precise application of that body 
of law in the cyber context. 
Scholars and practitioners have been laboring to address that uncertainty. 
Most significant in this regard have been the two Tallinn Manual projects 
sponsored by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence.3 
However, both manuals avoided claims of certainty where reasonable differ-
ences of opinion existed as to the interpretation of a rule of law in the cyber 
context. Indeed, their major contribution may have been in pointing out 
where views diverged, thereby allowing States to focus interpretive efforts 
where they were most needed. 
States are only now beginning to set forth their views on how interna-
tional law governs cyberspace. Notable examples are statements by, inter alia, 
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Australia,4 but they are 
                                                                                                                      
1. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the General Assembly: The Secretary-General’s 
Priorities for 2020 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-
01-22/remarks-general-assembly-priorities-for-2020. 
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Con-
sumer Summit, Stanford University (Feb. 13, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-
protection-summit. 
3. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OP-
ERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; TALLINN 
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013). 
4. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, United Kingdom, Cyber and International Law in 
the 21st Century, Chatham House (May 23, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/ 
event/cyber-and-international-law-21st-century; MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, REPUBLIC OF 
FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE (2019), 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+ 
law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf; Letter from the Netherlands Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal 
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overshadowed by the number of States that remain reticent to do so. Fur-
thermore, a review of State practice demonstrates that even States targeted 
by a hostile cyber operation often refrain from invoking the language of in-
ternational law when denouncing the attack, when attributing it to a mali-
cious State or non-State actor, or when resorting to cyber or non-cyber 
measures in response.5 
Numerous explanations have been proffered for the reluctance of States 
to invoke international law in relation to hostile cyber operations. One is the 
assertion that norms developed in a kinetic or offline context are inadequate 
to address the unique features of cyber operations, which can be perpetrated 
by proxies, are often designed to spoof the originator, and can cause non-
physical effects that are nevertheless very severe. For instance, the concepts 
of use of force and armed attack in the jus ad bellum seem ill-suited when 
applied to cyber operations that dramatically disrupt civilian life without 
causing physical damage or that target data. In the same vein, international 
humanitarian law’s rules on targeting cannot easily be interpreted and applied 
in the cyber context in a manner that reasonably balances military necessity 
and humanitarian considerations given the integrated nature of many military 
and civilian infrastructures.6 
The political or operational interests of States that find themselves on 
the virtual frontline, either facing hostile operations or launching them, is 
                                                                                                                      
Order in Cyberspace, app.: International Law in Cyberspace (July 5, 2019), https://www. 
government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parlia-
ment-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace; GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AUS-
TRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENT TO 
AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO STATE CON-
DUCT IN CYBERSPACE (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-rela-
tions/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html#Annex-A; 
see also 2019 INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT to id., https://www.dfat.gov.au/publica-
tions/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chap-
ters/2019_international_law_supplement.html. 
See also papers by States submitted to the 2019–2021 Advancing Responsible State 
Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security. Group of Government Ex-
perts, OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/dis-
armament/group-of-governmental-experts/ (last visited July 14, 2020); Open-Ended Working 
Group, OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/dis-
armament/open-ended-working-group/ (last visited July 14, 2020). 
5. Martha Finnemore & Duncan Hollis, Beyond Naming and Shaming: Accusations and In-
ternational Law in Cybersecurity, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 
2020). 
6. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting the Civilian Population during 
Cyber Operations, 101 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 333 (2019). 
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another common explanation for their hesitancy to invoke international law.7 
They may be reluctant to draw attention to a hostile cyber operation out of 
embarrassment, because doing so could reveal technical cyber security capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities, or due to concern that it would create unwelcome 
domestic pressure to respond. States on both sides of the equation might be 
apprehensive about committing to a specific interpretation of an interna-
tional law rule, such as on where the threshold for a violation of sovereignty 
or wrongful use of force lies. And some States certainly believe that a policy 
of deterrence unfettered by normative strictures offers a more promising way 
to prevent harmful cyber operations than reliance on international law norms 
and institutions. 
There may be, however, a further explanation for such reluctance—the 
lack of a credible attribution mechanism capable of validating the facts un-
derlying State legal claims regarding cyber operations. Such information is 
necessary not only to understand what actually happened, and to identify the 
culprit, but also to mobilize third-party support for the victim State’s asser-
tions, including through collective attribution of (and response to) the oper-
ation. More to the point, as a matter of law, “internationally wrongful acts” 
(violations of international law) require both breach of a State’s international 
law obligation and attribution of the act (which may consist of either an ac-
tion or an omission) to a “responsible” State.8 
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility are 
generally accepted as restating the customary international law standards for 
attribution to States. In the cyber context, the two most likely, albeit not 
only, bases for attribution are that an organ of a State, such as the armed 
forces, launched the cyber operation that breached the obligation in ques-
tion,9 or that a non-State actor, like a hacktivist group or a private company, 
did so upon the instructions or under the effective control of a State.10 There 
are different standards of proof depending on the purpose of the assertion 
                                                                                                                      
7. Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 5. 
8. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 10, art. 22, at 75–76, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 75–76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. For instance, the internationally 
wrongful act of violating another State’s sovereignty requires that the cyber operation qualify 
as a breach of sovereignty, for instance, because it causes permanent loss of functionality of 
the targeted cyberinfrastructure, and establishing that the operation had been conducted by 
a foreign State. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 4, at 17–27. 
9. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 4. 
10. Id. art. 8. 
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of unlawfulness,11 but legal rights under international law can only be effec-
tively invoked and relied upon in practice on the basis of an adequate factual 
foundation. 
The linkage between the need for factual information about those behind 
hostile cyber operations and giving effect to the rules of international law 
has been the driving force behind initiatives by the Atlantic Council,12 Mi-
crosoft,13 RAND,14 and academics in support of an international attribution 
mechanism.15 The goal of these initiatives is to promote accountability for 
past operations that violate international law and raise deterrence against fu-
ture ones. A potentially important step towards realizing this vision was the 
2019 establishment of the CyberPeace Institute, which is co-sponsored by 
the Hewlett Foundation, Mastercard, and Microsoft.16 Among its goals, the 
institute intends to perform, facilitate, and coordinate “collective analysis, 
research, and investigations of sophisticated cyberattacks” in order to “close 
the accountability gap.”17 Yet, to date, no concrete effort is underway to es-
tablish a full-fledged international mechanism charged with engaging in tech-
nical attribution of hostile cyber operations, and in linking such operations 
to States. 
It is against this backdrop that we organized an international research 
project funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federmann 
Cyber Security Research Center of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to 
consider the feasibility of establishing an international attribution mecha-
nism, as well as the usefulness of such a body.18 By international attribution 
                                                                                                                      
11. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 81–83. 
12. JASON HEALEY ET AL., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
IN CYBERSPACE: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY (2014). 
13. SCOTT CHARNEY ET AL., MICROSOFT, FROM ARTICULATION TO IMPLEMENTA-
TION: ENABLING PROGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY NORMS (2016). 
14. JOHN S. DAVIS II ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, STATELESS ATTRIBUTION (2017). 
15. See, e.g., Elena Chernenko, Oleg Demidov & Fyodor Lukyanov, Increasing Interna-
tional Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cyberse-
curity-and-adapting-cyber-norms; Milton Mueller et al., Cyber Attribution: Can a New Institu-
tion Achieve Transnational Credibility?, CYBER DEFENCE REVIEW, Spring 2019, at 107, 107. 
16. Who We Are, CYBERPEACE INSTITUTE, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/who-we-
are (last visited July 14, 2020). In full disclosure, Professor Michael Schmitt is a member of 
the CyberPeace Institute Advisory Board. 
17. Accountability, CYBER PEACE INSTITUTE, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/about-
us/accountability (last visited July 14, 2020). 
18. Details about the project and workshops it sponsored can be found on Federmann 
Cyber Security Research Center’s website. See Attribution of Cyber Attacks: Technological and 
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mechanism, we mean an entity that is multinational and diverse in its make-
up, whether composed of private individuals or public officials, with respon-
sibility for identifying the State or non-State actors who have either con-
ducted a hostile cyber operation or are otherwise involved in that operation. 
Workshops organized by the project brought together academics and 
policymakers, including experts with relevant legal, political, and technolog-
ical backgrounds, to discuss papers prepared by the project’s researchers on 
such topics as standards of proof for attributing cyber operations under the 
law of State responsibility, the use of private cybersecurity companies to in-
vestigate cyber incidents, investigative models drawn from other technology-
intensive fields like weapons control regimes, and the collective attribution 
practices of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO). This process enabled us to identify certain contexts in which 
an international attribution mechanism could prove useful and a number of 
constituencies that might be interested in turning to it in appropriate cases. 
The discussions, which were subject to the Chatham House Rule, have 
led us to conclude that, for the time being, States wielding significant cyber 
capability have little interest in creating an international attribution mecha-
nism for cyber incidents. Such States appear to be of the view that they can 
generate sufficient accountability and deterrence based on their independent 
technological capacity, access to expertise and to offensive (active defense) 
cyber tools, political clout, security alliances, and other policy tools, such as 
sanctions. 
At the same time, our discussions suggested that countries with limited 
technological capacity and less ability to mobilize international support for 
collective attribution are more amenable to the prospect, especially as a tool 
for “naming and shaming” States conducting unlawful cyber operations 
against private and public infrastructure in their territory. Furthermore, we 
are of the view that international or regional organizations that have the abil-
ity to facilitate collective sanctions in relation to unlawful cyber operations 
directed against member States or their partners, like the EU with its sanc-
tions regime,19 might appreciate in certain situations an official finding of 
legal responsibility for a number of political and legal reasons. 
                                                                                                                      
Legal Dimensions (CSRCI), https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/event/attributing-cyber-attacks (last vis-
ited July 14, 2020); International Accountability Mechanisms: Political and Legal Feasibility (CRCSI), 
https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/event/attribution-workshop (last visited July 14, 2020). 
19. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019, Concerning Restrictive 
Measures against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L 
1291) 13 (EC); Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796, Concerning Restrictive Measures against 
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This article examines several possible justifications for establishing an 
international attribution mechanism and its principal constituencies. Part II 
sets forth the general case for international fact-finding mechanisms in in-
ternational law, particularly when there is a need to rely on scientific and 
technological expertise. Part III details the shortcomings of the existing pro-
cesses for attributing responsibility for hostile cyber operations. Part IV re-
views proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism, while 
Part V examines the constituency for a new mechanism. Our concluding 
thoughts are set forth in Part VI. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF FACT-FINDING MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The linkage between international peace and security and international fact-
finding has a long pedigree in international law. In the aftermath of the Feb-
ruary 1898 sinking of USS Maine in Havana harbor and the ensuing Spanish-
American War,20 a Permanent Court of Arbitration was created pursuant to 
the 1899 Hague (I) Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, a body that continues to operate today.21 The agreement also pro-
vided for international commissions of inquiry “to facilitate a solution of 
[‘differences of opinion’] by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial 
and conscientious investigation.”22 Fyodor Martens, the prominent Russian 
diplomat who introduced the commissions of inquiry provisions during the 
1899 Peace Conference, described them as establishing a voluntary fact-find-
ing mechanism that could avoid inflammatory disinformation about the 
causes of an international dispute while gaining time to resolve the matter.23 
Interestingly, the Russian delegation to the 1899 Conference proposed 
adding the investigation of questions of responsibility to the duties of the 
commissions of inquiry, although Martens himself expressed limited enthu-
                                                                                                                      
Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L 1291) 1. For a 
summary, see Adam Botek, European Union Establishes a Sanction Regime for Cyber-attacks, CCD-
COE, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/european-union-establishes-a-sanction-re-
gime-for-cyber-attacks/ (last visited July 14, 2020). 
20. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 43–44 (4th ed. 2005). 
21. Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 20, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 2199, 205 
Consol. T.S. 536. 
22. Id. art. 9.  
23. THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 50 (James 
Brown Scott ed., 1917). 
 
 
 
An International Attribution Mechanism Vol. 96 
203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
siasm for the proposal, noting that it could trespass into the realm of arbi-
tration. He conceded, however, that States were free to conclude special 
agreements to that effect.24 Indeed, in 1904, a commission of inquiry estab-
lished to investigate a maritime incident in the North Sea was authorized to 
establish responsibility for the incident and to allocate the degree of blame 
of those involved.25 
In recent decades, fact-finding and inquiry mechanisms often have been 
employed in the field of international human rights law to establish account-
ability for violations and to facilitate subsequent action by political bodies 
entrusted with promoting respect for human rights. The frequent utilization 
of ad hoc bodies, such as commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions,26 
more permanent bodies with renewable mandates, such as thematic and 
country rapporteurs and working groups,27 and international treaty bodies 
invested with the power to conduct inquiries,28 reflects the international hu-
man rights system’s post-1967 shift from standard-setting to implementation 
activities.29 
                                                                                                                      
24. Id. at 313. 
25. Declaration between the United Kingdom and Russia Relating to the Constitution 
of an International Commission of Inquiry on the Subject of the North Sea Incident art. 2, 
Nov. 25, 1904, reprinted in HAGUE COURT REPORTS 411 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916). For 
a full discussion of this Commission, see Jan Martin Lemnitzer, International Commissions of 
Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for a MH17 Tribunal?, 27 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 923 (2016). 
26. For a list of the thirty-one ad hoc bodies established by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council, see List of HRC-Mandated Commissions of Inquiries/Fact-Finding Missions & Other Bodies 
(As of October 2019), UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/ListHRCMandat.aspx (last visited July 14, 2010). 
27. For a list of thematic and country specific mandates created by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council, see Country Mandates, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx (last 
visited July 14, 2020). 
28. For a list of U.N. human rights treaty bodies authorized to conduct inquiries, see 
Human Rights Bodies – Complaints Procedures, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/ 
HRTBPetitions.aspx (last visited July 14, 2020). 
29. Frans Viljoen, Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies – Analysis and Sug-
gested Reforms, 8 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 49, 54 (2004). It has 
also been suggested that human rights fact-finding, unlike traditional fact-finding, aims to 
identify and blame those responsible for violations. See Larissa J. van den Herik, An Inquiry 
into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating the Tensions between Fact-
Finding and Application of International Law, 13 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
507, 536–37 (2014). 
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Fact-finding mechanisms have also been used to support action by po-
litical bodies in other fields of international law, such as international civil 
aviation law30 and international labor law.31 By contrast, international human-
itarian law fact-finding mechanisms, most notably the fact-finding commis-
sion provided for in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,32 have not been operationalized because of limited interest in 
resorting to them by States involved in armed conflicts.33 
In many cases where fact-finding mechanisms have been established and 
utilized, the resort to independent experts links, directly or indirectly, to the 
goal of advancing legal and political accountability.34 By elucidating facts 
                                                                                                                      
30. See, e.g., John T. Phelps II, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 
107 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 255, 265 (1985). 
31. See, e.g., DAVID TAJGMAN & KAREN CURTIS, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A USER’S 
GUIDE – STANDARDS, PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION 72 (2000). 
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 90, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 52, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War art. 149, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
33. Heike Spieker, International (Humanitarian) Fact-Finding Commission, in THE MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 505, 513-514 (Frauke 
Lachenmann & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2017); Robert Heinsch, The Future of the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: A Possibly to Overcome the Weakness of IHL Compliance 
Mechanism, in THE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 81–82 
(Dražan Djukić & Niccolò Pons eds., 2018); van den Herik, supra note 29, at 529–31. 
34. Larissa J. van den Herick & Catherine Harwood, Commissions of Inquiry and the Charm 
of International Criminal Law: Between Transactional and Authoritative Approaches, in THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 233, 238–39 (Philip Alston & Sarah 
Knuckey eds., 2016); see also U.N. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, Situation of Human 
Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/1 (Nov. 23, 2011) 
Decides to dispatch urgently an independent international commission of inquiry, to be 
appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council, to investigate all alleged violations 
of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish 
the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpe-
trated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpe-
trators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held 
accountable. 
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 28/30, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building to 
Improve Human Rights in Libya, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/30 (Apr. 7, 2015) 
(“Requests the High Commissioner urgently to dispatch a mission to investigate violations 
and abuses of international human rights law committed in Libya since the beginning of 
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through a process of investigation that is legitimate and credible, States that 
violate international law are less able to avoid legal responsibility by denying 
the underlying facts or their involvement in the situation. Furthermore, pub-
licizing facts with self-evident legal or moral implications can “shame” State 
and non-State actors, as well as alert them and other actors to the possibility 
of being held accountable should they continue to engage in unlawful con-
duct.35 Determining the facts can also provide a degree of satisfaction for 
victims.36 And of course, establishing the factual record can enable follow-
up action to assign legal or political responsibility and the taking of appro-
priate measures against those responsible.37 In other words, fact-finding fos-
ters accountability by exposing facts and facilitating accountability-generat-
ing processes, thereby also enhancing deterrence. In doing so, fact-finding 
mechanisms contribute to the rule of law in international relations.38 
A specific area of international relations in which fact-finding mecha-
nisms have proven effective is arms control. Fact-finding in this field, espe-
cially with respect to the development, use, and proliferation of unconven-
tional weapons, is especially relevant to cyber activity because States tend to 
operate behind a shroud of national security secrecy and investigations re-
quire sophisticated scientific expertise to collect and analyze data. Examples 
include the technical verification mechanisms developed under the auspices 
                                                                                                                      
2014, and to establish the facts and circumstances of such abuses and violations with a view 
to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability.”); U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 
22/13, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013) 
Further decides that the commission of inquiry will investigate the systematic, widespread 
and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as out-
lined in paragraph 31 of the report of the Special Rapporteur, including the violation of the 
right to food, the violations associated with prison camps, torture and inhuman treatment, 
arbitrary detention, discrimination, violations of freedom of expression, violations of the 
right to life, violations of freedom of movement, and enforced disappearances, including in 
the form of abductions of nationals of other States, with a view to ensuring full accounta-
bility, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity. 
35. van den Herick & Harwood, supra note 34, 237–38. 
36. Cecilie Hellestveit, International Fact-Finding Mechanisms: Lighting Candles or Cursing 
Darkness?, in PROMOTING PEACE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 368, 369 (Cecilia 
Marcela Bailliet & Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen eds., 2015). 
37. Michael A. Becker & Sarah Nouwen, International Commissions of Inquiry: What Differ-
ence Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach, 30 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 819, 834 (2019). This is not always the case, for some fact-finding missions do 
not result in follow-up. See Romana Schweiger, Late Justice for Burundi, 55 INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 653, 656 n.22 and accompanying text (2006).  
38. Dan Saxon, Purpose and Legitimacy in International Fact-Finding Bodies, in QUALITY CON-
TROL IN FACT-FINDING 211, 219 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2013). 
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of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (through an Additional 
Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement),39 the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through the inspection 
activity of the Technical Secretariat),40 and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) (through the verification and monitoring activities of the 
Technical Secretariat).41 
Verification mechanisms typically have ongoing monitoring responsibil-
ities, such as routine inspections,42 and the collection of data from monitor-
ing stations43 and on-site instruments.44 They can also respond to specific 
concerns about compliance, as with “challenge inspections” under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention,45 investigation of alleged use of chemical 
weapons pursuant to the U.N. Secretary-General Mechanism,46 inspections 
upon request by a State party to clarify whether another State has conducted 
a nuclear test in violation of the CTBT,47 and special inspections undertaken 
                                                                                                                      
39. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Model Protocol Additional to the Agree-
ment(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, 
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540.Corr (Sept. 1997). 
40. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VIII, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S 
45 [hereinafter CWC]; id., Verification Annex. 
41. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, arts. II, IV, 35 INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (not yet in force) [hereinafter CTBT]; id, Protocol [here-
inafter CTBT Protocol]. 
42. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII(6), Oct. 23, 1956, 
276 U.N.T.S 3. 
43. CTBT Protocol, supra note 41, pt. I. 
44. CWC, supra note 40, Verification Annex, pt. III(B)(10). 
45. Id. art. X. 
46. G.A. Res. 42/37C, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (Nov. 30, 
1987). The Secretary-General resorted to this mechanism in 2013 in connection with alle-
gations that chemical weapons were used in Syria. The inspections, conducted by experts 
from the OPCW and World Health Organization, were authorized only to determine 
whether chemical weapons were used, without determining who used them. David Mar-
tin, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Hollow Idealism or Capable Mechanism? The Syrian Interven-
tion as a Test Case, 37 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
REVIEW 31, 50 (2015). 
47. CTBT, supra note 41, art. IV(D). See in particular id. ¶ 35 (“The sole Purpose of an 
on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, 
to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.”). 
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by the IAEA.48 In such cases, information collected and analyzed by verifi-
cation mechanisms can include, for instance, documents, technical data, 
samples, and interviews.49 
In that verification mechanisms have the potential to embarrass viola-
tors50 and set international legal and political processes of condemnation and 
sanction in motion,51 they are integral to the stability of arms control regimes. 
Such mechanisms not only deter would-be violators by enhancing the likeli-
hood of detection,52 but also provide a means for States to refute unfounded 
allegations. 
The recent resort by the United Kingdom to the OPCW inspection ma-
chinery in connection with the Salisbury incident illustrates how a technical 
fact-finding apparatus can be used to shame a violating State and support 
accountability. It also casts new light on some of the principled arguments 
discussed below, which question the necessity of developing an international 
accountability mechanism in the field of cyber security. 
On March 4, 2018, two Russian nationals were poisoned in Salisbury 
through exposure to a rare nerve agent. Eight days later, U.K. Prime Minister 
Theresa May announced in the House of Commons that the poison was a 
                                                                                                                      
48. See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Text of the Agreement be-
tween Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 73, at 17, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974); see 
also Wolfgang Fischer & Gotthard Stein, On-Site Inspections: Experiences from Nuclear Safeguard-
ing, 3 DISARMAMENT FORUM 45, 49–50 (1999). 
49. See, e.g., CTBT Protocol, supra note 41, at IV(D), ¶35; CWC, supra note 40, Verifi-
cation Annex, pt. XI(D), at 25–26 
The final report shall summarize the factual findings of the inspection, particularly with 
regard to the alleged use cited in the request. . . . If the inspection team collects through, 
inter alia, identification of any impurities or other substances during laboratory analysis of 
samples taken, any information in the course of its investigation that might serve to identify 
the origin of any chemical weapons used, that information shall be included in the report. 
But see Martin, supra note 46, at 50. 
50. TREVOR FINDLAY, PROLIFERATION ALERT! THE IAEA AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
REPORTING 73 (2015) (discussing the special inspection of the Republic of Korea). 
51. Thilo Marauhn, Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding, in THE CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 297, 325 (Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer & Ralf Trapp 
eds., 2014); David Cortright, Linda Gerber & George A. Lopez, Implementing Targeted Sanc-
tions: The Role of International Agencies and Regional Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL SANC-
TIONS: BETWEEN WARS AND WORDS 144, 146 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 
2005). 
52. Jenifer Mackby, Nonproliferation Verification and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 34 FORD-
HAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 697, 707 (2011); SARAH J. DIEHL & JAMES CLAY 
MOLTZ, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION 50 (2002). 
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military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia known as “No-
vichok.”53 The United Kingdom then took retaliatory measures against Rus-
sia, including the expulsion of twenty-three Russian diplomats.54 The United 
Kingdom also looked to the OPCW for help in investigating the incident, a 
decision welcomed by the EU.55 Following a technical assistance visit, the 
organization released a public summary of its findings on April 12.56 The full 
confidential report, which reportedly corroborated the U.K. law enforce-
ment findings concerning the nerve agent, was circulated to OPCW member 
States.57 On July 13, the United Kingdom asked again for OPCW assistance 
in investigating a poisoning incident, this time in Amesbury; the resulting 
report matched the Amesbury toxic chemicals with those found in Salis-
bury.58 
A central issue for the purposes of this article is the United Kingdom’s 
motivation in seeking OPCW assistance. That the OPCW merely confirmed 
the United Kingdom’s findings demonstrates that the organization was not 
filling a capability gap. Indeed, on March 27, even before completion of the 
OPCW investigation, twenty of the United Kingdom’s Western partners 
moved to expel Russian diplomats (more than one hundred in total) based 
                                                                                                                      
53. Prime Minister Theresa May, Oral Statement to Parliament: PM Commons State-
ment on Salisbury Incident: 12 March 2018 (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-12-march-2018. 
54. Russian Spy: UK to Expel 23 Russian Diplomats, BBC (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43402506. 
55. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Statement by the Foreign Affairs 
Council on the Salisbury Attack (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
press/press-releases/2018/03/19/statement-by-the-foreign-affairs-council-on-the-salis-
bury-attack/. 
56. Technical Secretariat, OPCW, Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report on 
Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/18), S/1612/2018, Apr. 12, 
2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1612-
2018_e_.pdf. 
57. Chemical Watchdog Confirms UK Findings on Salisbury Nerve Agent, UN NEWS (Apr. 18, 
2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1007642. 
58. Technical Secretariat, OPCW, Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report on 
Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/03/18 and TAV/03B/18 “Ames-
bury Incident”), S/1671/2018, Sept. 4, 2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/doc-
uments/2018/09/s-1671-2018%28e%29.pdf. 
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on those findings.59 Rather, it appears the United Kingdom leveraged the 
organization to enhance the credibility of its findings regarding the poison, 
thereby enabling it and other States to name, blame, and shame Russia more 
effectively.60 
Similarly, in a speech at the OPCW on June 26, 2018, U.K. Foreign Min-
ister Boris Johnson stressed the need to further enhance accountability by 
authorizing the Technical Secretariat to attribute responsibility for chemical 
attacks in the context of Syria. 
 
Our aim . . . is to reinforce the OPCW as an institution. Last November, 
the Security Council was prevented from renewing the Joint Investigative 
Mechanism, meaning that no international body is working to attribute re-
sponsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. At present, the OPCW’s 
experts will say where and when an attack happened, but not who was re-
sponsible. If we are serious about upholding the ban on chemical weapons, 
that gap must be filled. Attributing responsibility for an attack is clearly part 
of the OPCW’s technical remit, requiring no change to the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention. The Director General has confirmed that the OPCW is 
able and willing to perform this essential task.61 
 
In a decision adopted by the Conference of State Parties the next day, au-
thorization was granted. Reaffirming that “those responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons should be held accountable,” the Conference decided 
that: 
                                                                                                                      
59. Julian Borger, Patrick Wintour & Heather Stewart, Western Allies Expel Scores of Rus-
sian Diplomats over Skripal Attack, GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 2018, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/26/four-eu-states-set-to-expel-russian-diplomats-over-skri-
pal-attack. 
60. Interestingly enough, on March 13, 2018, the Russians called for the United King-
dom to involve the OPCW and to request their technical assistance in response to accusa-
tions by the United Kingdom, on the basis that they were not involved in the Salisbury 
incident. Executive Council, OPCW, Russian Federation: Statement by H.E. Ambassador A. V. 
Shulgin Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OPCW at the Eighty-Seventh Session 
of the Executive Council (On the Chemical Incident in Salisbury), EC-87/NAT.9, Mar. 13, 2018, 
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/87/en/ec87nat09_e_.pdf. 
61. Boris Johnson, U.K. Foreign Secretary, Foreign Secretary’s Speech at the OPCW 
Special Conference of the States Parties (June 26, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-at-the-opcw-special-conference-of-the-states-
parties. For criticism of the initiative, see Oliver Meier & Ralf Trapp, Playing Politics with Chem-
ical Weapons? The UK’s Initiative on Chemical Weapons Accountability, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS (June 20, 2018), https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/playing-politics-with-chemi-
cal-weapons-the-uks-initiative-on-chemical-weapons-accountability/. 
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the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating a possible 
chemical weapons use on its territory, can provide technical expertise to 
identify those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise 
involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, and further decide[d] that, in 
this context, the Director-General may enlist support as appropriate from 
outside experts with relevant qualifications and professional experience, 
and invites the Director-General to submit to the Conference at its next 
regular session specific proposals to establish such independent, impartial, 
expert arrangements.62 
 
The day after the Conference acted, the EU Council expressed support for 
the implementation of the decision and for the development of a chemical 
weapons sanctions regime.63 Such a regime subsequently was characterized 
by the United Kingdom as an effective means of holding individuals and 
entities responsible for the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.64 Fur-
ther Council support for “international initiatives aimed at tackling the threat 
of chemical weapons” came in October with the implementation of a sanc-
tions regime.65 
To summarize, flagrant violations of international law norms prohibiting 
the employment of chemical weapons initiated an effort to impose account-
ability through the use of an international fact-finding mechanism and by 
authorizing it to attribute legal responsibility. These moves were accompa-
nied by ad hoc sanctions against suspected perpetrators and the development 
of a standing sanctions mechanism. The question is whether a similar dy-
namic involving international fact-finding, attribution of international re-
sponsibility, and the imposition of collective sanctions would be viable in 
                                                                                                                      
62. Conference of the States Parties, OPCW, Decision: Addressing the Threat from Chemical 
Weapons Use, at 4, ¶ 20, C-SS-4/DEC.3, June 27, 2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css4dec3_e_.doc.pdf. 
63. Press Release, European Council, European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/ 
20180628-euco-conclusions-final/. 
64. Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, Foreign Sec-
retary Urges EU to Press Ahead with Listings Under New Chemical Weapons Sanctions 
Regime (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-urges-
eu-to-press-ahead-with-listings-under-new-chemical-weapons-sanctions-regime. The state-
ment also alluded to the need for a cyber-related sanctions regime. 
65. Council Decision 2018/1544 of 15 October 2018, Concerning Restrictive Measures 
against the Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons, 2018 O.J. (L 259) 25. 
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other fields of activity involving national security that pose technical attrib-
ution challenges and face denials by responsible States, specifically cyber op-
erations. 
 
III. THE PRESENT STATE OF CYBER ATTRIBUTION 
 
States that have fallen victim to hostile cyber operations are increasingly will-
ing to attribute them to other States.66 Moreover, attribution is often collec-
tive in the sense that it involves the issuance of a common statement or en-
dorsement of another State’s assertion of responsibility. The collective at-
tributions of the WannaCry67 and NotPetya68 cyber operations, as well as 
hostile cyber operations targeting the OPCW69 and Georgia,70 are illustrative 
of this developing practice. 
                                                                                                                      
66. For a survey of eleven prominent cyber operations that occurred between 2012 and 
2017 in which State involvement was suspected, see Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule 
Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AMER-
ICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 655–57 (2018). According to the survey, five 
cases did not result in an official statement by the victim State pointing the finger at the 
suspected attacking State, and in one case (the attack on the Bundestag) the statements made 
were somewhat uncertain. Furthermore, the survey suggests an increase in the rate of attrib-
utions during the surveyed period. See id.; see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Law & Politics 
of Cyberattack Attribution, 67 UCLA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020) (including under the 
definition of attribution not only official statements, but also indictments and technical 
alerts). 
67. Press Briefing, The White House, The Attribution of the WannaCry Malware At-
tack to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-
121917/ (attributing the malware attack to North Korea and indicating that the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan join the statement).  
68. Stilgherrian, Blaming Russia for NotPetya was Coordinated Diplomatic Action, ZDNET 
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/blaming-russia-for-notpetya-was-coordi-
nated-diplomatic-action/ (discussing the coordination of collective attribution by the 
United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land, Norway, Latvia, Sweden, and Finland). 
69. Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service Disrupts Russian Cyber Operation Target-
ing OPCW, GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.govern-
ment.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-service-
disrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw (noting that the attribution is supported by 
the United Kingdom and that the United States has opened a criminal investigation against 
the implicated GRU officers). 
70. Przemyslaw Roguski, Russian Cyber Attacks against Georgia, Public Attributions and Sov-
ereignty in Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69019/ 
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There has also been some progress in developing a structure for collec-
tive attribution. Of particular note, the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox,71 
which was adopted in 2017, provides for a joint EU diplomatic response to 
hostile cyber operations. It is premised on the belief that “clearly signaling 
the likely consequences of a joint EU diplomatic response to . . . malicious 
cyber activities influences the behavior of potential aggressors in cyberspace 
thus reinforcing the security of the EU and its Member States.”72 As part of 
the broader EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the EU established a cyber-re-
lated sanctions regime in 2019 that provides for the imposition of “targeted 
restrictive measures” on natural and legal persons.73 Both the Toolbox and 
the sanctions regime clarify, however, that a joint diplomatic response or the 
imposition of sanctions should be distinguished from a decision to attribute 
responsibility to a foreign State, which is described as “a sovereign political 
decision taken on a case-by-case basis,”74 one to be “based on all-source in-
telligence and . . . in accordance with [the] international law of State respon-
sibility.”75 
Other States and international and regional organizations are also craft-
ing collective responses to hostile cyber operations. In 2018, the United 
States announced an International Cyber Deterrence Initiative aimed at 
building a coalition of like-minded States that can act “in concert” to impose 
“consequences” on adversaries, so as to ensure that they “understand the 
consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.”76 The 2018 U.S. National 
Cyber Strategy also envisions intelligence sharing with key partners to iden-
tify hostile State and non-State cyber activities.77 The same year, NATO lead-
ers adopted the Brussels Summit Declaration, which confirmed that 
                                                                                                                      
russian-cyber-attacks-against-georgia-public-attributions-and-sovereignty-in-cyberspace/ 
(noting that more than twenty countries attributed the attacks to Russia). 
71. General Secretariat of the Council, Council of the European Union, Draft Council 
Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Ac-
tivities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”) – Adoption, 9916/17, June 7, 2017 [hereinafter Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox]. 
72. Id., annex, at 5, ¶ 4. 
73. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019, Concerning Restrictive 
Measures against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L 
129) 13 (EC); Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, supra note 71. 
74. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797, pmbl., ¶ 9. 
75. See Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, supra note 71, annex, at 5, ¶ 4. 
76. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 21 (2018). 
77. See id. The Strategy also stipulates that the U.S. intelligence community should “con-
tinue to lead the world in the use of all-source cyber intelligence to drive the identification 
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NATO’s collective defense policies applied to cyberspace and called on its 
members to consider responding to malicious cyber activity in a coordinated 
manner.78 
It should be noted that attribution is seldom accompanied in practice by 
the release of the underlying evidence, despite broad international support 
for the principle that States should, where possible, provide the basis for that 
attribution. For instance, the 2015 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the Context of International Security, which included all permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council and whose consensus report was endorsed by 
the General Assembly, noted that “accusations of organizing and imple-
menting wrongful acts brought against States should be substantiated.”79 
Still, the responsibility to release the evidence underlying attribution was 
styled as a voluntary, non-binding norm of responsible State behavior, not 
as a legal obligation. 
Indeed, key States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, 
have taken the position that there is no legal duty to accompany public acts 
                                                                                                                      
and attribution of malicious cyber activity that threatens United States national interests.” 
Id. 
78. Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–
12 July 2018, Press Release (2018) 074 (July 11, 2018) (last updated Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm 
Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. We must be able to operate 
as effectively in cyberspace as we do in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support 
the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defense posture. We therefore continue to implement 
cyberspace as a domain of operations. . . . We continue to work together to develop 
measures which would enable us to impose costs on those who harm us. Individual Allies 
may consider, when appropriate, attributing malicious cyber activity and responding in a 
coordinated manner, recognizing attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are de-
termined to deliver strong national cyber defenses through full implementation of the Cyber 
Defence Pledge, which is central to enhancing cyber resilience and raising the costs of a 
cyber-attack. We reaffirm our commitment to act in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human rights law, as applica-
ble. 
79. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), trans-
mitted by Letter Dated 22 July 2015 from the Secretary-General Comm. Established Pur-
suant to Resolution 68/243 (2014) Addressed to the General Assembly, ¶ 28(f), U.N. Doc. 
A/70/174 (July 22, 2015); G.A. Res. 70/237 (Dec. 30, 2015) (endorsing the report). 
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of attribution with disclosure of any underlying evidence.80 Although there 
are various reasons for the reluctance to commit to releasing evidence, the 
most commonly cited is that such a practice can risk revealing intelligence 
sources and methods and cyber capabilities. Yet, absent supporting evidence, 
the credibility of public attribution is open to challenge. Likewise, collective 
attribution is less likely when intelligence on an incident is not shared. 
Evidentiary issues might also hamper regional mechanisms for cyber-
related sanctions. For example, the EU cyber-related sanctions regime is 
based on a list of natural or legal persons responsible for hostile cyber oper-
ations. Inclusion on the list by the Council requires the proposal of a member 
State or the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Although those targeted by restrictive measures may submit observations 
leading to reevaluation, the sanctions regime neither specifies the requisite 
evidentiary threshold for inclusion, nor mandates the sharing of the under-
lying intelligence with other member States.81 
It is worth noting that some commentators have expressed doubt as to 
the effectiveness of recent collective attribution statements, noting the lim-
ited number of States involved, a frequent lack of transparency surrounding 
the process of attribution, the failure to identify specific international law 
obligations that the operations breached, and the lack of political will in fol-
lowing up with the imposition of sanctions and other responses against the 
responsible State.82 Arguably, these shortcomings hinder the development of 
substantive law in the field of cyber security, since they provide few indica-
tions of those cyber operations that States consider unlawful—information 
that is essential in both the interpretation of existing legal rules in the cyber 
context and the crystallization of new rules of customary international law.83 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
80. Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 177 (2017); Wright, supra note 4; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 
supra note 3, at 83. 
81. Such evidentiary standards must meet, however, the requirements set by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union for application of individual sanctions. See, e.g., Case 
C-176/13 P, Council v. Bank Mellat, ¶127, EU:C:2016:96 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
82. See Anushka Kaushik, Public Attribution and Its Scope and Efficacy as a Policy Tool in 
Cyberspace, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ORF) (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.or-
fonline.org/expert-speak/public-attribution-and-its-scope-and-efficacy-as-a-policy-tool-in-
cyberspace-56826/; see also Roguski, supra note 70. 
83. Eichensehr, supra note 66, at 30; Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 5, at 12. 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION MECHANISMS 
 
Against this backdrop, there have been numerous calls for the establishment 
of an international attribution mechanism that would foster public confi-
dence in the attribution claims of national security agencies and private cyber 
security companies. Although such public and private bodies have consider-
able professional expertise, their work tends to lack transparency,84 and their 
governmental affiliation or commercial interests sometimes render their 
claims suspect.85 
An independent international mechanism could lend credibility to attrib-
ution in the cyber realm, thereby limiting the ability of responsible States to 
deny involvement and facilitating collective attribution and response. Like 
the OPCW Technical Secretariat, such a mechanism could prove useful for 
State and non-State actors in certain situations.86 To be sure, such a mecha-
nism should complement, not replace, existing attribution mechanisms and 
practices. Optimally, it should find ways to harness the evidence gathering 
and analytical wherewithal of State agencies, and the technical expertise res-
ident in the public and private cyber security sectors. 
Several initiatives aimed at promoting an international attribution mech-
anism have been launched in recent years. In 2014, the Atlantic Council, a 
Washington, D.C.-based think tank, proposed the establishment of a Multi-
lateral Cyber Adjudication and Attribution Council (MCAAC).87 The 
MCAAC would serve as an inter-State body entrusted with investigating 
cyber incidents with a view to attributing responsibility to States when ap-
propriate. It could then issue recommendations for de-escalation or refer the 
matter to other political or adjudicative bodies. The Atlantic Council’s pro-
posal envisioned the gradual development of such a mechanism as ad hoc 
coalitions of States undertook joint investigations of hostile cyber opera-
tions, sometimes in collaboration with private actors. 
                                                                                                                      
84. Florian J. Egloff & Andreas Wenger, Public Attribution of Cyber Incidents, 244 CSS 
ANALYSES IN SECURITY POLICY, no. 2, May 2019, at 1, 1. 
85. Sasha Romanosky & Benjamin Boudreaux, Private Sector Attribution of Cyber Incidents: 
Benefits and Risks to the U.S. Government 20 (RAND Working Paper WR-1267-OSD, 2019). 
86. One concern raised in this context by Eichensehr is the proliferation of attributions. 
Eichensehr, supra note 66. Still, creating a new centralized attribution institution may, over 
time, limit reliance on decentralized and multiple attribution bodies. 
87. JASON HEALEY ET AL., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
IN CYBERSPACE: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY 10–12 
(2014). 
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In 2016, Microsoft published a proposal for an attribution premised on 
the investigation of incidents by international experts comprising a public-
private organization.88 The organization would conduct a technical investi-
gation of certain operations that fell within its purview and report its find-
ings, including evidence of attribution. Only in certain cases would the find-
ings be published publicly. The proposal envisioned the mechanism as also 
offering a form of peer review of attribution claims made by other public or 
private entities. 
The following year, the RAND Corporation proposed a Stateless attrib-
ution mechanism consisting of a consortium of private experts specializing 
in cyber technology and policy that would, on a discretionary basis, investi-
gate and attribute incidents, as well as provide analysis concerning the sever-
ity of the incident and the sophistication of the operation. While the consor-
tium would not be involved in follow-up action, other stakeholders might 
use its findings for that purpose.89 
Eventually, in 2019, Microsoft joined forces with Mastercard and the 
Hewlett Foundation to establish the CyberPeace Institute.90 The Institute’s 
mandate includes promoting accountability in cyberspace by facilitating col-
laborative research into the behavior of those launching hostile cyber oper-
ations and ways to fend off such operations, and through publishing infor-
mation on the techniques, practices, and effects of attack tools. In other 
words, it is less an attribution mechanism than an entity producing infor-
mation that can help other entities effectively attribute. 
With the exception of the CyberPeace Institute, which has been estab-
lished, neither these nor other initiatives91 have gained much momentum. 
Based on discussions during the Federmann Cyber Security Research Cen-
ter’s workshops with legal, policy, and technical experts, diplomats and other 
State officials, academics, and industry executives, several tentative reasons 
for this lack of progress can be identified. 
To begin with, and perhaps most significantly, some major State actors 
in the field of cyber security appear uninterested in developing an interna-
tional attribution mechanism, largely out of a sense that the mechanism 
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89. JOHN S. DAVID II ET AL., STATELESS ATTRIBUTION: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CYBERSPACE (2017). 
90. See supra note 15. 
91. See, e.g., SERGE DROZ & DANIEL STAUFFACHER, ICT FOR PEACE FOUNDATION, 
TRUST AND ATTRIBUTION IN CYBERSPACE: A PROPOSAL FOR AN INDEPENDENT NET-
WORK OF ORGANISATIONS ENGAGING IN ATTRIBUTION PEER-REVIEW (2018). 
 
 
 
An International Attribution Mechanism Vol. 96 
217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
would be redundant. After all, powerful and technologically savvy States 
have developed processes for technical attribution that rely upon their own 
technical forensic capacity, as well as their intelligence assets, especially sig-
nals intelligence and human intelligence. When required, they collaborate 
with their partners, some of whom also field impressive capabilities to per-
form attribution; occasionally, they even turn to private cyber security com-
panies to provide specialized expertise. Once such States can attribute, they 
have the offensive tools and the political and economic clout to respond 
meaningfully to hostile cyber operations, either alone or in collaboration with 
other States. 
Moreover, some States appear skeptical about the very push for legal 
accountability. Arguably, the proposed mechanism would help to clarify the 
law applicable to cyber operations, thereby limiting the operational flexibility 
that results from legal ambiguity. In the view of skeptical States, legal clarity 
constrains the cyber operations of “rule of law” States, but proves ineffective 
in limiting operations by adversaries that do not share that commitment to 
the rule of law. Viewing international law as asymmetrically disadvantageous, 
these States would prefer to rely on self-help, like robust cyber defenses, 
offensive tools, and credible warnings, rather than international law, to safe-
guard their cyberspace.92 They fear that referral of incidents to an interna-
tional attribution mechanism might over time deprive them of the discretion 
ambiguity offers in terms of attribution and response options.93 
Some workshop participants also suggested the initiatives have a number 
of shortcomings that have impeded acceptance. For instance, they opined 
that the Atlantic Council proposal is short on detail and that a few of its 
features—especially vis-à-vis attribution follow-up—could be regarded as 
overly ambitious. Its inter-State aspects also pose a risk of politicization.94 
The Microsoft proposal is likewise lacking in detail. Further, in that it prof-
fered a hybrid institution, States may have been apprehensive about sharing 
the allocation of State responsibility with non-State actors. The fact that the 
proposal was put forward by a powerful global commercial entity also gen-
erated some skepticism, fair or not, as to Microsoft’s motives. The RAND 
proposal is more detailed but envisages a Stateless mechanism over whose 
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configuration, mandate, and modus operandi States would have limited influ-
ence. This arrangement is unlikely to appeal to States, especially when com-
parable investigative services are available from private companies. 
Finally, numerous participants were of the view that the case for an in-
ternational attribution mechanism would have been strengthened had the 
initiatives more directly identified the specific constituencies likely to be ef-
fectively served and the contexts in which the proposals would prove most 
useful. In other words, the proposals could be characterized as overbroad in 
the sense that they called for a major restructuring of cyber attribution and 
the underlying concept of accountability. Thus, some participants argued 
that a more sophisticated approach would have been to associate the pro-
posed mechanism with specific needs—a need to increase global capacity to 
make credible attribution claims, a need to encourage collective attributions, 
and a need to support multilateral follow-up efforts. 
 
V. THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Effective application of international law to any domain of international re-
lations hinges on the interaction between legal norms, fact-finding processes 
that identify violations and attribute responsibility to a State or non-State 
actor, and follow-up measures, which can include shaming, making claims in 
diplomatic or adjudicative fora, and imposing sanctions, including counter-
measures.95 The legitimacy of each link in the chain is premised on the legit-
imacy of the preceding links; thus, the legitimacy of accusations and re-
sponses depends on the legitimacy of the underlying legal rules and attribu-
tion process.96 Specifically, the legitimacy of the attribution process under-
girds the ability of an accuser to convince relevant target audiences, including 
third States that might join collective attribution statements or support mul-
tilateral sanctions.97 
As explained above, fact-finding provides a basis for legal and political 
claims. Thus, fact-finding mechanisms are especially useful in fields where 
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legal compliance is chronically deficient, such as human rights law, where 
there is a special need to further legitimize norm-implementation efforts and 
increase deterrence, or where unique technical challenges present them-
selves, as in the case of unconventional weapons. Indeed, the use of the 
OPCW’s technical facilities in connection with the Salisbury incident illus-
trates the benefits of fact-finding in cases requiring complex scientific anal-
ysis, as well as the growing interest of States in internationalizing attribution 
processes. 
Moving forward, we maintain that the goal of creating an international 
attribution mechanism remains viable and that such an entity would prove 
valuable, albeit primarily in three contexts. First, an international attribution 
mechanism could prove useful for States with a limited independent capacity 
to effectively generate accountability. This includes States that, on the one 
hand, are sufficiently advanced technologically so as to render them highly 
vulnerable to hostile cyber operations, but, on the other hand, lack the tech-
nological capability to conduct their own forensic investigations98 and access 
to high-quality intelligence that can support attribution to a State actor.99 In 
this context, an international attribution mechanism could help level the 
playing field. 
Furthermore, small and mid-size States often lack the diplomatic, eco-
nomic, technical, or military means to effectively respond, when appropriate, 
to hostile cyber operations,100 thereby making them dependent on their abil-
ity to mobilize other States to support them. Yet, relying on other States or 
private cybersecurity companies for attribution assistance risks having the 
information provided dismissed as politically biased or profit driven. As a 
result, it might not generate the level of legitimacy needed to mobilize third 
States. 
An international attribution mechanism could prove especially useful in 
this regard. A properly crafted mechanism would be more likely to be per-
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ceived as independent, impartial, and professionally reliable. Its factual con-
clusions would presumably enjoy significant traction, which would enhance 
the victim State’s ability to generate assistance in imposing accountability. 
Second, the creation of an international attribution mechanism would 
signal the growing interest of States in collective attribution, as broad con-
demnation and multilateral responses are more likely to promote accounta-
bility than the reactions of a single State. Collective attribution is most effec-
tive when there is a high level of confidence in the initial attribution deter-
mination. Such confidence can derive from close relations among relevant 
States, such as ongoing cooperation between their intelligence agencies, or 
through legitimacy-enhancing measures, like transparency. 
But in our estimation, an international attribution mechanism would be 
especially likely to foster collective attribution because of the legitimacy it 
would presumably enjoy.101 In particular, a credible attribution process would 
empower States supportive of the rule of law in international relations to 
take a principled stand beside the victim State.102 The same logic that led to 
the integration of fact-finding mechanisms in the realm of human rights law 
to publicly name and shame human rights violators and, in certain cases, to 
mobilize third States to sanction them applies mutatis mutandis here. 
Third, an international attribution mechanism could play an important 
role in connection with the operation of cyber-related sanction regimes, such 
as that of the EU. Such regimes rely upon trust in individual attribution de-
terminations by member States. However, since they involve sanctions on 
natural or legal actors that may be associated with foreign States, the smooth 
operation of the regime generally requires a higher level of confidence than 
might otherwise be the case with collective attribution. 
An independent professional mechanism could offer verification of in-
dividual attribution claims, assuaging the concerns of States about the relia-
bility of the attribution determinations upon which they are being asked to 
take action. Moreover, since cyber-related sanction regimes like the EU’s 
have implications under the domestic law of the member States, such as the 
freezing of assets and travel restrictions, domestic courts may examine the 
evidence underlying the sanction decision or seek credible assurance that the 
fact-finding process was independent, fair, and provided those involved an 
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opportunity to contest the findings against them.103 An international attribu-
tion mechanism could, should it offer features along these lines, help satisfy 
this demand. 
In sum, the configuration of the international attribution mechanism 
must be responsive to the goal of supporting States facing capacity issues, 
those interested in collective attribution, and cyber-related sanctions re-
gimes. We believe additional research is called for in order to enumerate and 
ascertain specific “client” preferences and expectations. Key institutional de-
sign choices would emanate from such mapping of needs. These include (1) 
whether the optimal composition is public, private, or hybrid in nature; (2) 
the triggers to initiation of the mechanism’s investigation; (3) the extent to 
which a mechanism should be tasked with responsibility beyond technical 
attribution, such as attribution under the law of State responsibility; (4) the 
necessary arrangements for access to forensic evidence and intelligence ma-
terials, including confidential sharing of information; (5) the opportunity of 
entities to whom attribution is made to contest evidence collected against 
them; and (6) whether, and if so when, attribution decisions and supporting 
evidence should be made public. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
International fact-finding is a venerable institution. It offers a credible pro-
cess for ascertaining facts underlying international incidents, and, sometimes, 
the attribution of legal responsibility for violation of international law norms. 
Fact-finding mechanisms have been utilized extensively in certain fields of 
international law, particularly human rights and weapons control, to generate 
accountability and deterrence. In such fields, it can play an integral role in 
implementing the rule of law and developing and interpreting relevant inter-
national law norms. 
We believe there is merit in the prospect of an independent international 
attribution mechanism for cyber operations, one along the lines of, but not 
necessarily identical to, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat. Cyber operations 
represent a field of activity plagued by normative ambiguity and limited ac-
countability, where reliance on the victim State’s attribution capacities, or 
those of other States or private cybersecurity companies, may not measure 
up to the challenges. An independent attribution mechanism could lead to 
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attribution determinations enjoying a higher degree of legitimacy, thereby 
serving as a stabilizing force in international relations. 
To date, proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism 
have not acquired momentum, either because they contain features that 
States find unattractive or because they were not developed to a degree that 
made States comfortable. However, we believe progress remains possible by 
focusing on the three logical constituencies for such a body—States with 
limited technological, intelligence, and diplomatic capacity; States interested 
in generating broad collective attribution of attacks perpetrated against them; 
and international and regional organizations operating a cyber-related sanc-
tions regime. Such a focus, combined with greater granularity, would signif-
icantly improve the prospects for the establishment of an international at-
tribution mechanism and its eventual utilization by the international com-
munity. 
 
